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Abstract—Botnets (networks of compromised computers) 
are often used for malicious activities such as spam, click 
fraud, identity theft, phishing, and distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks. Most of previous researches have 
introduced fully or partially signature-based botnet 
detection approaches. In this paper, we propose a fully 
anomaly-based approach that requires no a priori 
knowledge of bot signatures, botnet C&C protocols, and 
C&C server addresses. We start from inherent 
characteristics of botnets. Bots connect to the C&C 
channel and execute the received commands. Bots 
belonging to the same botnet receive the same commands 
that causes them having similar netflows characteristics 
and performing same attacks. Our method clusters bots 
with similar netflows and attacks in different time 
windows and perform correlation to identify bot infected 
hosts. We have developed a prototype system and 
evaluated it with real-world traces including normal 
traffic and several real-world botnet traces. The results 
show that our approach has high detection accuracy and 
low false positive. 
Keywords—Botnet; Netflow; Clustering; Anomaly-based 
Detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Botnet is a collection of compromised hosts (bots) 
that are under control of an attacker (botmaster). Bots 
are used to send spam emails, host phishing web sites, 
cooperate in distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks, and other kinds of malicious activities. 
Botmaster needs a command and control (C&C) 
channel to command the bots and coordinate malicious 
activities. Most of botnets C&C channels are using IRC 
(Internet Relay Chat) protocol. In this protocol, 
botmaster has a real-time communication with the bots. 
There are also a few botnets that use the HTTP protocol 
for C&C channels [1][2]. In HTTP-based C&C, the 
botmaster does not communicate directly with the bots. 
Instead, the bots periodically contact the C&C server to 
obtain their commands. These two protocols provide a 
centralized C&C mechanism. The main disadvantage of 
centralized C&C mechanism is the single-point-of-
failure problem. For example, if IRC or HTTP server is 
taken down, the botmaster will not be able to 
communicate with the bots anymore. Thus, botmasters 
began using peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols for C&C 
channels. Currently, Storm Worm [3] and Nugache [4] 
are the most popular P2P botnets. 
For designing a botnet detection approach that is 
resistant to the changes of the C&C mechanisms, we 
should study inherent characteristics of botnet 
behaviors. Bots connect to the C&C channel and 
execute the received commands. Bots belonging to the 
same botnet receive the same commands that causes 
them having similar netflows characteristics and 
performing same attacks. There are netflows that 
present communication between bots and C&C servers 
such as binary downloading and sending spam. Also, 
there are several types of attacks like scanning and 
distributed denial of service (DDoS). Our method is 
based on detecting these anomalous behaviors and 
finding meaningful relation between these activities to 
detect set of bots inside the monitored network. This 
paper makes the following main contributions: 
• We propose an anomaly-based method that 
requires no a priori knowledge of bot 
signatures, botnet C&C protocols, and the C&C 
server addresses. 
• We illustrate a method that can detect bots in 
the monitored network in real-time. 
• In addition to detect bots with malicious 
activities (e.g. scanning, DDoS), our method 
can detect bots that do not perform malicious 
activities. But, our approach detects bots with 
malicious activities so fast. 
• We have developed a prototype system based 
on our method and evaluated it with real-world 
network traces including normal traffic and 
several real-world botnet traces. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We 
review the related works in section 2. Section 3 
describes the architecture and implementation of the 
approach. Section 4 evaluates the effectiveness of the 
approach on various network traces and finally the 
paper is concluded in section 5. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
There are several researches that propose different 
botnet detection approaches. Binkley and Singh [5] 
combines IRC statistics and TCP work weight to detect 
IRC-based botnets. Karasaridis [6] used IRC netflows 
and scanning activities to detect IRC botnet controllers. 
Livadas [7] proposed a machine learning based 
approach which uses network-level traffic features of 
chat protocols for botnet detection. Rishi [8] is a 
signature-based IRC botnet detection approach that 
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Figure 1. Similarity in bots behaviors in consecutive time windows 
finds suspicious nicknames by analyzing IRC-based 
botnets traffic. The above approaches are used for only 
detecting IRC-based botnets; whereas we do not have 
assumption about botnet C&C protocols. BotHunter [9] 
uses a user-defined bot infection model in order to 
correlate alerts (e.g. scanning). BotSniffer [10] is a 
centralized botnet C&C detection approach that 
performs group analysis across multiple hosts through 
different time windows. But, it is used for detecting 
centralized botnets. BotMiner [11] clusters hosts based 
on their netflow-level statistics (e.g., the byte count, the 
packet count, etc.) and their malicious activities (e.g., 
scanning) and then correlates clusters to find bots. 
Nevertheless, it works offline and cannot detect bots 
quickly. BotProbe [12] proposes an active botnet 
probing technique that detects bots by distinguishing 
botnet C&C dialogs from human-human conversations. 
The aforementioned approaches are mostly signature-
based and cannot find unknown botnets. 
III. BOTNET DETECTION APPROACH 
In this section, we illustrate a new botnet detection 
approach whose goal is to detect groups of bot infected 
hosts which belong to the same botnet in a monitored 
network. Bots belonging to the same botnet have 
similar behaviors during a time window and this 
similarity continues during consecutive time windows 
as shown in Fig. 1. Our approach finds behavior 
similarity of hosts in different properties such as 
netflow information through a predefined time window 
and tries to detect bots by correlating these similar 
behaviors between different time windows. 
Fig. 2 shows the architecture of our botnet detection 
approach, which consists of nine interconnected 
components that analyze traffic online. Traffic 
dispatching component delivers traffic to Domain-IP 
Mapping, Netflow Generating and Alert Generating 
components. Domain-IP Mapping component maps the 
DNS domains to corresponded IPs for filtering 
purposes. Netflow Generating component generates 
TCP netflows between hosts. Alert Generating 
component reports the malicious activities of the hosts 
like scanning. The following five components perform 
at the end of each time window. Alert Filtering 
component filters useless alerts generated by Alert 
Generating component and Netflow Filtering filters the 
netflows generated by Netflow Generating component 
by using database produced by Domain-IP Mapping 
component. Then Netflow Clustering and Alert 
Clustering components cluster non-filtered netflows and 
alerts. Finally at the end of each time window 
correlation engine correlates the generated alert clusters 
and netflow clusters in order to detect bot infected 
hosts. The following sections illustrate architecture of 
our approach in detail. Our botnet detection approach 
operates on online traffic and detects bots in real-time. 
The following sections will illustrate each component in 
details. 
A. Traffic Dispatching 
This component has been designed for separating 
different types of traffic of Domain-IP Mapping, 
Netflow Generating and Alert Generating components. 
It delivers DNS traffic to Domain-IP Mapping and TCP 
traffic to Netflow Generating component. Also TCP, 
UDP and ICMP traffic is delivered to Alert Generating 
component. Irrelevant traffics like DHCP and ARP will 
be filtered out in order to increase performance. 
B. Domain-IP Mapping 
As discussed above, the bots can use the IPs or DNS 
names hard coded in their binary file in order to connect 
to the C&C servers. This component has been designed 
to map the domains and IPs to each other. This 
component processes DNS queries and responses in 
order to store in database the IP addresses in 
correspondence with the queried domain names. This 
database only is used to filter netflow to the sites in the 
white list as described in Netflow Filtering section. 
C. Netflow Generating 
This component processes TCP traffic and generates the 
netflows between hosts. Most of the routers like Cisco 
and Juniper have the capability of generating netflows. 
Also open source tools like ARGUS exist. We 
developed our own efficient tool to generate netflows. 
In addition to simple netflows, our tool is able to 
generate partial netflows (netflows that is not finished 
inside a time windows, is considered as a completed 
netflow, the remained part of the netflow is considered 
as another netflow in next time windows). The most 
important property of our tool is its efficiency and 
customized netflow record generating. Currently, we 
consider only TCP netflows. Each netflow has the 
following information: start time, end time, source 
 
Figure 2. Botnet Detection Approach Architecture 
IP/Port, destination IP/Port, number of sent/received 
packets and number of sent/received bytes. 
D. Alert Generating 
This component reports the malicious activities of the 
hosts like scanning which is the most important activity 
that can be done by bots. Currently, this component 
contains sub-component scanning which will be 
illustrated in the following. The scanning sub-
component uses the sfPortscan preprocessor of Snort 
(an open source IDS) which can detect several types of 
scanning such as decoy portscan, distributed portscan 
and portsweep for TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols. 
E. Netflow Filtering 
In order to increase the performance of the approach, 
we filter out useless netflows by the following rules: 
1. Netflows related to communications between 
internal hosts and netflows initiated from 
external hosts towards internal hosts. Netflows 
of which do not contain any payload (e.g. 
scanning netflows). 
2. Netflows of which contain bulky payloads that 
seem to be large file downloading traffic and 
their payloads size are higher than 
BULKY_THR factor. In our experiment, we 
consider it as 1MB. By analyzing the traffic of 
several botnet types we found out that the 
maximum netflow size of them is lower than 
this threshold.  
3. Netflows of which their destination server is in 
the whitelist (known servers like google and 
yahoo). This list is generated and updated by 
system administrator manually. 
This filtering does not have any effect on the 
detection accuracy of our approach and only improves 
the efficiency of our approach. 
F. Alert Filtering 
This component filters out useless alerts generated by 
activities such as scanning by external hosts. This 
filtering does not have any effect on the detection 
accuracy of our approach and only improves the 
efficiency of our approach. 
 
G. Netflow Clustering 
This component clusters the netflows with similar 
communication patterns in the given time window 
based on flow-level feature set and payloads. Fig. 3 
shows this two-level netflow clustering. 
 
Figure 3. Two-Level Netflow Clustering 
In the first level clustering, we determine a number of 
features for each netflow that together create a vector 
for that netflow. These features are: number of sent 
packets, number of sent bytes, average number of bytes 
per sent packet, average number of sent bytes per 
second, number of received packets, number of 
received bytes, average number of bytes per received 
packet, and average number of received bytes per 
second. 
The netflow vectors of two bots in a botnet are 
similar to each other; therefore we use a clustering 
algorithm in order to cluster similar vectors. For first 
level clustering, X-means clustering [13] method has 
been used which in contrast to K-means algorithm does 
not need to know the number of clusters. X-means 
repeats K-means cycle and uses Bayesian Information 
Criterion [13] to calculate the best value for K. 
In order to increase the accuracy of clustering, we 
perform second level clustering on the first level 
generated clusters. As a result, first level clusters are 
broken to new clusters in which the single netflow 
clusters are filtered out. Second level clustering 
performs on the payloads of the netflows. Each netflow 
has two payloads: the sent payload which is obtained by 
joining sent packets from the source to the destination, 
and the received payload which is obtained by joining 
the sent packets from the destination to the source. For 
second level clustering, we use hierarchical clustering, 
and NCD [14] is used for calculating the payload 
similarity. Equation (1) is used for calculating the 
distance of a pair of netflows, which ݓ௦  and ݓ௥ 
coefficients are calculated using (2) and (3). In (1), 
ݓ௦ ൅ ݓ௥ ൌ 1 and ܵܲ is the sent payload and ܴܲ is the 
received payload. 
 
݀൫ܨ௜, ܨ௝൯ ൌ ݓ௦ ൈ ܰܥܦ൫ܵ ௜ܲ, ܵ ௝ܲ൯ ൅ ݓ௥ ൈ ܰܥܦ൫ܴ ௜ܲ, ܴ ௝ܲ൯ (1) 
ݓ௦ ൌ
|ܵ ௜ܲ| ൅ หܵ ௝ܲห
|ܵ ௜ܲ| ൅ หܵ ௝ܲห ൅ |ܴ ௜ܲ| ൅ หܴ ௝ܲห
 (2) 
ݓ௥ ൌ
|ܴ ௜ܲ| ൅ หܴ ௝ܲห
|ܵ ௜ܲ| ൅ หܵ ௝ܲห ൅ |ܴ ௜ܲ| ൅ หܴ ௝ܲห
 (3) 
 
We calculate the distance between each pair of 
netflows and then form a hierarchical tree. Therefore, 
we have to extract the clusters out of this tree. Number 
of these clusters depends on cut-off factor ܦܫܵܶ_ܶܪܴ 
which shows the distance between netflow payloads. By 
analyzing the netflows of different types of botnets and 
calculating their payload distance we consider this 
factor as 0.35.  
H. Alert Clustering 
This component performs a clustering on the 
generated scanning alerts. We can use the following 
features for clustering of scanning alerts: scanned port, 
scanned net or subnet, and type of scanning. In this 
implementation, type of scanning has been used for 
clustering of scanning alerts. 
I. Correlation Engine 
This component considers several time windows that 
their size (ܹܶ_ܵܫܼܧ) which its default value is 20 
minutes. We found that different types of botnets have 
at least one activity during his time. Correlation 
operation is performed at the end of each time window. 
Fig. 4 shows the netflow and the alert clusters generated 
in the time windows. 
The correlation engine component has a table of 
hosts in which every host has a specific score. Now, 
during the correlation step, this component correlates 
the clusters inside the current time window with all 
other clusters in the same time window, and with the 
clusters of a number (ܯܣܺ_ܷܰܯ_ܹܶ) of previous time 
windows. Therefore, if bots are active in a time 
window, they will be detected at the end of that time 
window. Its default value is set to 3 because maximum 
distance between bots activity is at most 3 time 
windows. 
Figure 4. Generated clusters in the time windows 
The score of the hosts which belong to the correlated 
clusters is increased, and the score of the hosts which 
did not belong to the correlated clusters is decreased. 
Fig. 5 shows the algorithm which calculates the score of 
host h in time window N. This score is calculated as the 
maximum return value of the function ܹܶܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
(presented in Fig. 6) in ܯܣܺ_ܷܰܯ_ܹܶ iterative calls 
(for ܯܣܺ_ܷܰܯ_ܹܶ previous time windows). Also, the 
score of the hosts which did not belong to the correlated 
clusters is decreased by difference of current time 
window and the last correlated time window 
(݈ܽݏݐܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐܹ݁݀ܶ) of those hosts. 
ࢌ࢛࢔ࢉ࢚࢏࢕࢔ ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ሺ݄, ܰሻ: 
maxSܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ െ1 
 
ࢌ࢕࢘ ݅ ൌ 0 ࢚࢕ ܯܣܺ_ܷܰܯ_ܹܶ: 
ݐݓܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ  ܹܶܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺ݄, ܶ ேܹ, ܶ ேܹି௜ሻ 
࢏ࢌ ݐݓܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൒ 0: 
࢏ࢌ ݉ܽݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌൌ െ1 ݋ݎ ݐݓܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൐ ݉ܽݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁: 
݉ܽݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ ݐݓܵܿ݋ݎ݁ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊ࢏ࢌ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊ࢏ࢌ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊࢌ࢕࢘ 
 
࢏ࢌ ݉ܽݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ് െ1: 
࢘ࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔ ݉ܽݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁ 
ࢋ࢒࢙ࢋ: 
࢘ࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔ െ 1 ൈ ሺܰ െ ݈ܽݏݐܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݁݀ܶ ௛ܹሻ ࢋ࢔ࢊ ࢌ࢛࢔ࢉ࢚࢏࢕࢔ 
Figure 5. Score of host h in Time Window N 
Fig. 6 shows the function that calculates correlation 
score between two time windows (ܹܶܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊). 
ࢌ࢛࢔ࢉ࢚࢏࢕࢔ ܹܶܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊൫݄, ܶ ௜ܹ, ܶ ௝ܹ൯: 
݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܵ݁ݐ ൌ ሼሽ 
ݐݓܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ 0 
ࢌ࢕࢘ ܿ௜ ࢏࢔ ܥ்ௐ೔௛ : 
ࢌ࢕࢘ ௝ܿ ࢏࢔ ܥ்ௐೕ௛ : 
࢏ࢌ ܥ݈ݑݏݐ݁ݎܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊൫ܿ௜ , ௝ܿ൯ ൒ ܥܱܴܴ_ܶܪܴ: 
݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܵ݁ݐ. ݅݊ݏ݁ݎݐሺܿ௜ ሻ ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܵ݁ݐ. ݅݊ݏ݁ݎݐሺ ௝ܿ ሻ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊ࢏ࢌ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊࢌ࢕࢘ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊࢌ࢕࢘ 
 
ࢌ࢕࢘ ܿ ࢏࢔ ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܵ݁ݐ: 
ݐݓܵܿ݋ݎ݁൅ൌ ൜1, ݐݕ݌݁ሺܿሻ ൌൌ ܰ݁ݐ݂݈݋ݓ2, ݐݕ݌݁ሺܿሻ ൌൌ ܵܿܽ݊݊݅݊݃ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊࢌ࢕࢘ 
 
࢘ࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔ ݉݅݊ሺݐݓܵܿ݋ݎ݁, ܯܣܺ_ܹܶ_ܵܥܱܴܧሻ 
ࢋ࢔ࢊ ࢌ࢛࢔ࢉ࢚࢏࢕࢔
Figure 6. Time window correlation 
Equation (4) shows the correlation degree calculation 
method. In (4), ܿ௜ and ௝ܿ are two clusters and ݆ ൒ ݅. 
ܥ݈ݑݏݐ݁ݎܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊൫ܿ௜, ௝ܿ൯ ൌ 1 െ ݁
ିቆห௖೔ת௖ೕหห௖೔׫௖ೕหൈห௖೔ת௖ೕหൈ
ଵ
ሺ௝ି௜ሻାଵቇ (4) 
  
Correlation degree is close to 1 if the two clusters 
have higher intersection percent, higher intersection 
count, and less time window distance (distance between 
time windows which the two clusters belong to). 
The TWCorrelation function considers all of the 
correlated clusters. Each netflow cluster adds 1, and 
each alert cluster adds 2 points to the time window 
correlation score. To reduce false positives, the 
maximum calculated score of a host in each time 
window is MAX_TW_SCORE. We set this factor to 5. 
We call two clusters correlated, if their correlation 
degree exceeds CORR_THR (correlation threshold). A 
host is reported as a bot, if its score exceeds 
ܤܱܶ_ܶܪܴ (bot threshold). By studying different types of 
botnets, in our experiment, ܥܱܴܴ_ܶܪܴ and ܤܱܶ_ܶܪܴ is 
considered 0.65 and 33 respectively. In the following 
TABLE I.   
NETWORK TRACES STATISTICS 
Trace Num. of Clients Size Duration 
Num. of Packets Num. of 
TCP Netflows Total ICMP TCP UDP 
Normal 28 44 GB 215 h 74,974,692 658,747 61,752,609 12,563,336 818,362 
IRC-SdBot 4 2.3 MB 30 h 18,685 0 17,072 1,613 16 
IRC-SpyBot 4 37.9 MB 30 h 468,026 2,708 464,054 1,264 421,870 
HTTP-Bot-I 4 6.2 MB 30 h 16,926 0 15,214 1,712 1,164 
HTTP-Bot-II 4 5.3 MB 30 h 14,594 0 14,054 540 1,069 
section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our approach 
on various network traces. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS 
To evaluate the performance of proposed botnet 
detection approach, it is tested on several real-world 
network traces, including normal and collected botnet 
traffics. 
A. Data Collection 
We have captured part of our traffic traces for 
continuous 8 days period from part of our campus 
network. We assume that this traffic trace is clean 
because of the two following reasons. First, the traffic 
trace has been captured from the network which is 
behind NAT and the outside attackers cannot exploit 
internal hosts. Second, internal network users do not 
have administrator access and cannot run malicious 
binaries (e.g. downloading and running suspicious 
email attachments). A random sampling of the network 
trace shows that the traffic is diverse, containing normal 
application protocols, such as HTTP, FTP, SSH, DNS. 
We have collected a total of four different botnets 
covering IRC and HTTP. The basic statistics of these 
traces are listed in Table I. We use two IRC and two 
HTTP botnet traces, i.e., IRC-SdBot, IRC-SpyBot, 
HTTP-Bot-I and HTTP-Bot-II. IRC-SdBot and  
IRC-SpyBot are generated by executing modified bot 
code (SdBot and SpyBot [15]) in a fully controlled 
virtual network. Each trace contains four Windows XP 
IRC bot clients, and last 30 hours. HTTP-Bot-I and 
HTTP-Bot-II are generated according to the description 
of web-based C&C communications in [1][2]. In 
HTTP-Bot-I, the bot periodically connect to HTTP 
server every five minutes and the whole trace lasts for 
30 hours. In HTTP-Bot-II, we have a more stealthy 
C&C communication where the bot waits a random 
time between 0 to 10 minutes each time before it visits 
the server and the whole trace lasts for 30 hours. The 
bots communicate with a controlled C&C server (IRC 
or HTTP server) and execute the received commands. 
We set up a virtual network environment with 17 
Windows XP virtual machines using VirtualBox. We 
ran each bot on four Windows XP virtual machines and 
an IRC server and an HTTP server on one Windows XP 
virtual machine. 
B. Evaluation Results 
In order to validate the detection accuracy of our 
approach, we mixed botnet traffic to normal traffic. We 
also initially did not apply the forth filtering rule listed 
in section Netflow Filtering (whitelist) on traffic traces. 
Table II reports the detection results for each botnet. 
Table II shows that our approach is able to detect all  
 
four botnets. For 3 out of 4 botnets, we obtained 100% 
detection rate, i.e., we successfully identified all the 
bots within the 3 botnets. For example, in the case of 
IRC botnets (SdBot and SpyBot), our approach 
correctly detected all of the botnet members. 
HTTP-Bot-I contains 4 bot clients. 
TABLE II.   
DETECTION RESULTS 
Trace Num. of Clients Detected as Bot FP/FN 
Normal 28 2 2/0 
IRC-SdBot 4 4 0/0 
IRC-SpyBot 4 4 0/0 
HTTP-Bot-I 4 4 0/0 
HTTP-Bot-II 4 2 0/2 
Our approach was able to identify all of the bots. In 
the case of HTTP-Bot-II, we correctly detected bots. 
However, two of bots belonging to the botnet was not 
detected, which means that the detector generated two 
false negatives. There were some cases in which our 
approach also generated two false positives. We 
discovered that by applying the forth filtering rule of 
section 3.5 which use white list, the false positives no 
longer occur. 
As we can see, our approach performs very well in 
our experiments, showing very high detection accuracy 
with relatively low false positives in real-world network 
traces. 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
Botnet detection is a very challenging research area. 
In this paper, we presented a fully anomaly-based 
botnet detection approach that requires no a priori 
knowledge of bot signatures, botnet C&C protocols, 
and C&C server addresses. Our approach is based on 
the intuition that bots respond to commands and 
perform malicious activities in a similar fashion. Our 
approach shows high detection accuracy on real-world 
botnets with a low false positive on normal traffic. 
In our future work, we will study DDoS attacks and 
implement a DDoS alert generating sub-component for 
our alert generating component. In addition, we plan to 
further improve the efficiency of the netflow clustering 
algorithm to work in very high speed networks. 
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